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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANkRuPTCy 
FEDERAL TAX 
AuTOMATIC STAy. 	The	debtor	filed	for	Chapter	13	and	
listed an unsecured priority claim for federal income taxes owed 
to the IRS. The debtor’s plan provided for full payment of 
the	claim	and	the	plan	was	confirmed	without	objection.		Five	
months later, during the plan and when the debtor was not in 
default,	the	IRS	filed	for	relief	from	the	automatic	stay	to	offset	
a refund claim by the debtor against the bankruptcy claim. The 
debtor argued (1) no right of setoff existed because there was 
no mutuality between the claims and (2) the IRS was bound 
by	 the	provisions	of	 the	confirmed	plan	and	was	 required	 to	
receive payments under the plan. The court initially looked at 
whether the IRS was entitled to relief from the automatic stay 
merely because it had a right of setoff. The court noted mixed 
precedent on this issue but also noted that the BankruptcyAbuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 included 
a provision which made the automatic stay inapplicable to 
governmental claim setoffs, indicating that such a right did not 
exist at the time of this case. Thus, the court held that the IRS 
was not entitled to relief from the automatic stay merely because 
it had a right of setoff of mutual claims but the IRS had to show 
some cause for relief from the automatic stay. The court noted 
that the IRS did not claim any improper conduct by the debtor 
or any danger to the IRS claim. The court held that the IRS was 
bound	by	the	terms	of	the	confirmed	plan	and	was	not	entitled	
to relief from the automatic stay. In re Schultz, 2005-2 u.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,635 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005). 
FEDERAL AGRICuLTuRAL 
PROGRAMS 
COFFEE. The United States Customs Service seized 600 
sacks of beans from the defendant’s premises and after testing 
the beans, determined that the beans were not from Puerto 
Rico and thus were imported without payment of duties. The 
beans were determined to be from another country because the 
beans were infested with bugs not found in Puerto Rico. The 
infestation	also	made	the	beans	unfit	for	human	consumption	
and	were	confiscated.	The	defendant	claimed	that	the	tests	were	 
inconclusive because the insect damage was minimal and could 
be	purified	by	the	roasting	process.	The	court	held	that	the	insect	
test	was	sufficient	to	show	that	the	beans	were	imported	and	
were contraband because there were no records of importation 
or payment of duties. The contraband nature of the beans 
precluded the defendant from arguing that it was an innocent 
purchaser of the beans. The court also held that the beans could 
be	confiscated	as	adulterated	food	because	of	the	insect	damage	
because the pre-roasted beans were “food,” even though the beans 
would need to be roasted before being consumed. united States 
v. Approximately 600 Sacks of Green Coffee Beans Seized 
from Cafe Rico, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. P.R. 2005). 
FARM LABOR. The National Agricultural Statistics Service 
has	issued	farm	employment	figures	as	of	October	9-15,	2005.	
There were 1,129,000 hired workers on the nation’s farms and 
ranches the week of October 9-15, 2005, down 4 percent from 
a year ago. Of these hired workers, 840,000 workers were hired 
directly by farm operators. Agricultural service employees on 
farms and ranches made up the remaining 289,000 workers. All 
NASS reports are available free of charge on the internet. For 
access, go to the NASS Home Page at: http:/www.usda.gov/nass/.
Sp Sy 8 (11-05). 
GRAZING RIGHTS. In 1995, the plaintiff was granted a a 
ten year grazing permit for 265 head of cattle and eight horses on 
two allotments covering 17,000 acres in the Gila National Forest. 
A dispute arose between the plaintiff and the U.S. Forest Service 
as to the need for the grazing permit and the USFS canceled the 
permit in 1996 and ordered the plaintiff to remove the livestock. 
When the plaintiff failed to stop grazing on the land, the USFS 
sued for damages from trespass and for an injunction. The plaintiff 
argued that the plaintiff owned the surface rights to the land 
and the ejection order was an unconstitutional taking without 
compensation. The trial court ruled in favor of the USFS and the 
plaintiff removed the livestock. The ruling in that case did not 
bar the plaintiff’s claim for compensation in the Court of Federal 
Claims.		In	2004	the	plaintiff	filed	the	complaint	in	the	current	
case in the Court of Federal Claims asserting the unconstitutional 
taking claim. The USFS argued that the ruling in the original 
case estopped the plaintiff from raising the issue of ownership 
in the allotment. The court originally ruled for the USFS but, on 
reconsideration, the court held that, under state law, the water, 
access and forage rights were separate rights from the ownership 
of	 the	 allotment;	 therefore,	 the	 court	 certified	 the	 question	 of	
ownership of water, access and forage to the New Mexico highest 
court. Walker v. united States, 2005 u.S. Claims LEXIS 314 
(Fed. Cls. 2005). 
PAyMENT LIMITATIONS. In 1998, the FSA ruled that the 
plaintiffs and two other persons violated the limitation on farm 
program	payments	by	claiming	to	be	five	separate	persons.	The	
plaintiffs appealed that ruling but the National Appeals Division 
ruled against them. The plaintiffs repaid the amounts erroneously 
received but the other two persons did not. In 2002, the FSA
ruled that the plaintiffs were jointly and severally liable for the 
amounts owed by the other two persons. The plaintiffs argued 
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that,	under	7	C.F.R.	§	1400.7,	they	could	not	be	liable	for	the	
other amounts because they and the other two were not “one 
person”	as	defined	by	7	C.F.R.	§	1400.3.		The	court	looked	at	
the original FSA ruling and appeals and found that the NAD 
ruled	that	 the	five	persons	were	not	separate	persons	because	
they did not keep separate funds. The evidence showed that the 
five	persons	had	all	guaranteed	loans	for	the	farming	operation,	
indicating that they were not separate owners in the operation. 
The court held that the determination that the plaintiffs were 
not separate “persons” under payment limitation rules was 
sufficient	to	impose	joint	and	several	liability	on	the	plaintiffs	
for the amounts owed by the other two persons. The court also 
noted that the FSA was entitled to deference in interpreting its 
regulations and the plaintiffs’ liability under the regulations. 
Mitchell v. Johanns, 2005 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 28196 (S.D. Iowa 
2005). 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
IRA. The decedent’s estate included two IRAs, each of which 
consisted of marketable securities. On the estate tax return the 
value	of	the	IRAs	was	discounted	by	21	and	22	percent	to	reflect	
the anticipated income tax liability from distribution of the IRA
assets	 to	 the	 beneficiaries.	The	 estate	 argued	 that,	 under	 the	
valuation of assets under the willing buyer/willing seller test, 
the	income	tax	liability	to	a	beneficiary	of	IRA	would	decrease	
the price willing to be paid for the IRA assets. The estate cited 
Estate of Davis v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 530 (1998) which held that 
the value of a gift of stock was decreased by the tax on built-in 
capital gains to which the corporation’s assets was subject. the 
court distinguished the present case from Davis by noting that the 
stock in the IRAwas not subject on resale to any tax liability. The 
estate also cited Estate of Smith v. Comm’r, 198 F.3d 5115 (5th 
Cir. 1999),	which	held	that	the	income	tax	benefit	of	a	deduction	 
resulting from a claim against the estate should be included in the 
valuation of estate assets. The court also rejected this precedent 
as inapplicable in this case because the IRA assets, the stock, 
did not themselves carry any future tax liability; the income 
tax	liability	arose	out	of	the	beneficiaries’	receipt	of	the	stock	
from an IRA and this liability did not pass to any hypothetical 
or	real	buyer	of	the	stock	from	the	beneficiary.		The	estate	also	
cited Davis v. Comm’r, supra as allowing a discount for lack of 
marketability of IRAs. The court held that this argument did not 
apply because the assets in question were not the interests in the 
IRAs, but the stock held by the IRAs. The estate also cited cases 
involving unassignable lottery annual payments and land subject 
to zoning laws or land which was contaminated. The court held 
that none of the cases applied here because the assets involved, 
the	stock,	had	no	special	legal	restrictions	or	difficulties	which	
would make the stock less valuable. The court held that the IRA 
assets were to be valued at the full fair market value of the stock 
on the decedent’s death. Estate of kahn v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. 
No. 11 (2005). 
MARITALDEDuCTION. The decedent’s will bequeathed 
all the residuary estate to the decedent’s surviving spouse if 
the surviving spouse is living when the estate is distributed. 
If the surviving spouse died before the estate was distributed, 
the residuary estate passed to the decedent’s children. The 
estate claimed a marital deduction for the property which 
passed to the surviving spouse who did survive to receive the 
distribution.		Under	Rev.	Code	Wash.	§	11.108.010(4),	if	it	is	
determined that a testator intended a marital deduction gift in 
a will, the will shall be construed to comply with the federal 
marital deduction. the court noted that the decedent had ample 
notice of the marital deduction law and obtained surviving 
spouse insurance (provides funds for payment of estate tax), 
indicating the decedent’s intent to make the bequest to the 
surviving	 spouse	 without	 qualification.	The	 court	 held	 that	
the decedent intended to make a marital deduction bequest in 
the will provision for the surviving spouse and held that, for 
purposes of the marital deduction, the court would ignore the 
inconsistent language withdrawing the bequest if the surviving 
spouse did not survive until after the estate distribution. Thus, 
the reformed will provision did not place a time limitation on 
the	bequest	to	the	surviving	spouse	and	the	bequest	qualified	
for the federal marital deduction. Sowder v. united States, 
2005-2 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,512 (E.D. Wash. 2005). 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
BuSINESS DEDuCTIONS. The taxpayer claimed 
deductions in excess of revenue from a bed and breakfast 
operation for part of the taxpayer’s residence. The evidence 
showed that the taxpayer’s daughter and family lived in the 
bed and breakfast area for an undetermined portion of the tax 
year. The taxpayer did not keep records of the revenues and 
expenses associated with the bed and breakfast operation and 
could not show how many days in the tax year the area was 
rented to non-family members. The court upheld the IRS 
denial of the deduction for lack of substantiation and failure 
to prove that the area was used for personal use for less than 
the greater of 14 days or 10 percent of the time the area was 
rented to the public. The taxpayer also claimed deductions for 
expenses relating to travel and supplies for writing activities. 
The taxpayer did not have any evidence of any revenues from 
the writing activities, did not keep any records of the amount 
of time spent on the activity over several tax years, and did not 
have	any	profit	from	the	activity.		The	court	upheld	the	IRS	
denial of the deductions because the taxpayer did not show a 
profit	motive	for	the	activity.			Lofstrom v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. 
No. 13 (2005). 
CHARITABLE DEDuCTIONS. The IRS has issued a 
reminder for partnerships	and	S	corporations	with	fiscal	 tax	
years beginning in 2004 and ending after August 27, 2005, 
that two provisions in the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73,	may	benefit	their	partners	and	 
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shareholders.	The	first	provision,	Act	§	301,	suspends	certain	
limitations applicable to charitable contributions by individuals 
and	 corporations.	The	 second	provision,	Act	 §	 305,	 extends	
to partnerships and S corporations the enhanced deduction 
for contributions of food inventory otherwise available only 
to corporations. The announcement, which supplements the 
2005 instructions to Forms 1065 and 1120-S, also explains 
reporting requirements on Schedule K-1 for partnerships and 
S corporations. Ann. 2005-84, I.R.B. 2005-48. 
DISASTER LOSSES. On October 26, 2005, the president 
determined that certain areas in New Hampshire are eligible 
for assistance from the government under the Disaster Relief 
and	Emergency	Assistance	Act	(42	U.S.C.	§	5121) as a result 
of	 severe	 storms	 and	 flooding,	 which	 began	 on	 October	 7,	
2005. FEMA-1610-DR. On November 8, 2005, the president 
determined that certain areas in the Northern Mariana Islands 
are eligible for assistance from the government under the 
Act as a result of Typhoon Nabi, which began on August 30, 
2005. FEMA-1611-DR. On November 8, 2005, the president 
determined that certain areas in Indiana are eligible for 
assistance from the government under the Act as a result of a 
tornado and severe storms, which began on November 6, 2005. 
FEMA-1612-DR. Taxpayers who sustained losses attributable 
to the disaster may deduct the losses on their 2004 returns. 
HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOuNT. The IRS has issued 
guidance on eligibility to contribute to a Health SavingsAccount 
(HSA) during a cafeteria plan grace period as described in Notice 
2005-42, I.R.B. 2005-23, 1204. An individual participating in 
a	health	flexible	 spending	arrangement	 (health	FSA)	who	 is	
covered by the grace period is generally not eligible to contribute 
to	an	HSA	until	the	first	day	of	the	first	month	following	the	
end of the grace period, even if the participant’s health FSA has 
no	unused	benefits	at	the	end	of	the	prior	cafeteria	plan	year.	
The guidance shows how an employer may amend the cafeteria 
plan document to enable a health FSA participant to become 
HSA eligible during the grace period. Notice 2005-86, I.R.B. 
2005-49. 
The IRS has extended the transitional relief for taxpayers in 
states which require health insurance plans without a deductible 
or with a deductible amount less than that required for a “high 
deductible health plan” as required for the federal HSAs. The 
IRS stated that low deductible plans will be treated as qualifying 
under	I.R.C.	§	223(c)(2)	if	 the	only	reason	the	plans	are	not	
HDHPs	 is	 because	 of	 state-mandated	 benefits,	 effective	 for	
months before January 1, 2006, for state requirements in effect 
on January 1, 2004. The IRS noted that, even though a state may 
amend its laws before January 1, 2006, to authorize HDHPs, 
non-calendar year plans may fail to qualify after January 1, 
2006,	because	existing	benefits	cannot	be	changed	until	the	next	
renewal date. Thus under the extension, for any coverage period 
of 12 months or less beginning before January 1, 2006, a health 
plan	that	does	not	meet	the	definition	of	an	HDHP	because	it	
complied with state-mandated requirements to provide certain 
benefits	without	 regard	 to	a	deductible,	or	with	a	deductible	
below the minimum annual deductible requirements, will be 
treated as an HDHP. This relief is provided only until the earlier 
of the health plan’s next renewal date or December 31, 2006. 
Notice 2005-83, I.R.B. 2005-49. 
INTEREST.	The	IRS	has	announced	the	2006	figure,	$163,300,	
which may be loaned to a qualifying continuing care facility at 
a below-market interest rate without incurring imputed interest. 
Rev. Rul. 2005-75, I.R.B. 2005-49. 
PARTNERSHIPS 
DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE. The IRS has issued proposed 
regulations which provide rules for testing the substantiality of 
an	allocation	under	I.R.C.	§	704(b)	where	the	partners	are	look-
through entities or members of a consolidated group, provide 
additional guidance on the effect of other provisions, such as 
I.R.C.	§	482,	upon	the	tax	treatment	of	a	partner	with	respect	to	
the	partner’s	distributive	share	under	I.R.C.	§	704(b),	and	revise	
the existing rules for determining the partners’ interests in a 
partnership. 70 Fed. Reg. 69919 (Nov. 18, 2005). 
SALE OF PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS. The taxpayer owned 
interests in a partnership which owned an interest in a corporation 
controlled by the taxpayer. The companies were both involved in 
a	single	project	and	when	the	partnership	encountered	financial	
difficulties,	 the	 partnership	 creditors	 required	 the	 taxpayer	 to	
sell the taxpayer’s interest in the partnership and contribute the 
proceeds to the corporation. The corporation listed the contribution 
as a liability to the taxpayer and repaid $15,000 of the contribution. 
The	taxpayer	filed	an	income	tax	return	which	reported	all	of	the	
sale proceeds as gain because the taxpayer had a zero basis in the 
sold	partnership	interests.		The	taxpayer	filed	an	amended	return	
which claimed a basis in the partnership interest of the amount 
still owed by the corporation. The taxpayer did not provide any 
evidence to support the claimed basis in the partnership interests. 
The court held that the taxpayer had no basis in the partnership 
interests sold. The taxpayer also argued that the taxpayer should 
not be taxed on proceeds which the taxpayer could not personally 
keep but was required to contribute to the corporation. In effect, 
the	interests	were	sold	by	the	partnership	as	part	of	the	financing	
for the inter-company project. The court held that the taxpayer 
was liable for the gain on the sale of the partnership interests 
because the interests belonged to the taxpayer before the sale. 
Doll v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-269. 
PENSION PLANS. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(1)-1(c)(7)(i)	defines	 
covered compensation for an employee as the average (without 
indexing) of the taxable wage bases in effect for each calendar 
year during the 35-year period ending with the last day of the 
calendar year in which the employee attains (or will attain) social 
security retirement age.A35-year period is used for all individuals 
regardless of the year of birth of the individual. In determining 
an employee’s covered compensation for a plan year, the taxable 
wage	base	for	all	calendar	years	beginning	after	the	first	day	of	
the plan year is assumed to be the same as the taxable wage base 
in effect as of the beginning of the plan year. An employee’s 
covered compensation for a plan year beginning after the 35-year 
period applicable under Treas.	Reg.	§	1.401(1)-1(c)(7)(i) is the 
employee’s covered compensation for a plan year during which 
the 35-year period ends. An employee’s covered compensation 
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for a plan year beginning before the 35-year period applicable 
under Treas.	 Reg.	 §	 1.401(1)-1(c)(7)(i) is the taxable wage 
base in effect as of the beginning of the plan year. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.401(1)-1(c)(7)(ii) provides that, for purposes of determining 
the amount of an employee’s covered compensation under Treas. 
Reg.	§		1.401(1)-1(c)(7)(i), a plan may use tables, provided by 
the Commissioner, that are developed by rounding the actual 
amounts of covered compensation for different years of birth. 
The IRS has issued tables of covered compensation under I.R.C. 
§	401(l)(5)(E)	for	the	2006	plan	year.		Rev. Rul. 2005-72, I.R.B. 
2005-46, 944. 
QuALIFIED DEBT INSTRuMENTS. The IRS has 
announced the 2006 inflation adjusted amounts of debt 
instruments which qualify for the interest rate limitations under 
I.R.C.	§§	483	and	1274:
Year of Sale 1274A(b) 1274A(c)(2)(A)

or Exchange Amount Amount

2006 $4,630,300 $3,307,400
The $4,630,300	figure	is	the	dividing	line	for	2006	below	which	
(in	terms	of	seller	financing)	the	minimum	interest	rate	is	the	
lesser of 9 percent or the Applicable Federal Rate. See SAFE 
HARBOR INTEREST RATES, infra. Where the amount of 
seller	financing	exceeds	the	$4,630,300	figure,	the	imputed	rate	
is 100 percent of the AFR except in cases of sale-leaseback 
transactions, where the imputed rate is 110 percent of AFR. If 
the	amount	of	seller	financing	is	$3,307,400 or less (for 2006), 
both parties may elect to account for the interest under the cash 
method of accounting. Rev. Rul. 2005-76, I.R.B. 2005-49. 
RETuRNS. The IRS has posted drafts of several forms in 
the Topics for Tax Professionals section of the IRS web site 
(http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/topic/index.html) under Draft Tax 
Forms. Posted forms included the 2005 Original Issue Discount 
Tables (text and PDF versions), released in advance of the 2005 
version of Publication 1212; a draft of Form 8804, Schedule A
(2005), Penalty for Underpayment of Estimated Section 1446 
Tax by Partnerships; and a draft of Form 8903 (2005), Domestic 
Production Activities Deduction. Advance proof copies of IRS 
tax	forms	are	subject	to	change	and	Office	of	Management	and	
Budget	approval	before	they	are	officially	released. 
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES 
December 2005 
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term 
AFR 4.34 4.29 4.27 4.25 
110 percent AFR 4.78 4.72 4.69 4.67 
120 percent AFR 5.22 5.15 5.12 5.10 
Mid-term 
AFR 4.52 4.47 4.45 4.43 
110 percent AFR 4.98 4.92 4.89 4.87 
120 percent AFR 5.43 5.36 5.32 5.30 
Long-term
AFR 4.79 4.73 4.70 4.68 
110 percent AFR 5.27 5.20 5.17 5.14 
120 percent AFR 5.76 5.68 5.64 5.61 
Rev. Rul. 2005-77, I.R.B. 2005-49. 
S CORPORATIONS 
NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS. The IRS has announced 
guidance	regarding	the	election	under	I.R.C.	§	1361(c)(1)(D), 
which allows members of a family to be treated as a single S 
corporation shareholder. The election was created by Section 
231 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) (the Act). The IRS also 
announced that it intends to issue future guidance. Section 
231 of the Act allows any family member to make an election 
under	new	I.R.C.	§	1361(c)(1)(D) to treat all members of the 
family as one shareholder of an S corporation for purposes of 
determining the number of shareholders of the corporation. The 
election is relevant only to the determination of whether the 
corporation has no more than 100 shareholders as required under 
I.R.C.	§	1361(b)(1)(A) and has no impact on any other existing 
requirement	 for	 qualification	 as	 an	 S	 corporation.	The	 term	
“members	of	the	family”	is	defined	in	I.R.C.	§	1361(c)(1)(B)
to include (i) the common ancestor, (ii) the lineal descendants 
of the common ancestor, and (iii) the spouses (or former 
spouses) of the lineal descendants or of the common ancestor. 
The common ancestor may not be more than six generations 
removed from the youngest generation of shareholders who 
would be members of the common ancestor’s family (but for 
the six-generation limit for identifying the common ancestor). 
This	test	is	applied	as	of	the	later	of	the	effective	date	of	I.R.C.	§	
1361(c)(1), as amended by theAct, or the time the S corporation 
election under I.R.C. §	1362(a)	(the S corporation election) is 
made. The election may be made (except as provided in Treasury 
regulations) by any member of the family. The election does 
not affect the requirement under I.R.C. §	1362(a)(2) that an S 
corporation election must be consented to by all shareholders, 
whether or not “members of the family,” who are shareholders 
at the time of the S corporation election. The election may be 
made for taxable years of the S corporation beginning after 
December	31,	2004.	The	election	will	be	effective	as	of	the	first	
day	of	the	S	corporation’s	taxable	year	identified	in	the	election	
as	the	first	taxable	year	of	the	corporation	for	which	the	election	
is effective, and shall remain in effect until terminated as 
provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary. A member 
of the family who is (or is treated under I.R.C. §	1361 and the 
regulations thereunder as) a shareholder of the S corporation 
may make the election. The election is made by notifying the 
corporation	to	which	the	election	applies.	The	notification	shall	
identify by name the member of the family making the election, 
the “common ancestor” of the family to which the election 
applies,	and	the	first	taxable	year	of	the	corporation	for	which	
the election is to be effective. For purposes of identifying the 
common ancestor (who does not have to be alive at the time the 
election is made) any spouse or former spouse of the common 
ancestor will be treated as being in the same generation as the 
common ancestor, and any spouse or former spouse of a lineal 
descendant of the common ancestor will be treated as being 
in the same generation as the lineal descendant to whom that 
spouse is or was married. For purposes of the election, the estate 
of a deceased member of the family will be considered to be a 
member of the family during the period in which the estate, or 
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a trust described in I.R.C. §	1361(c)(2)(A)(iii), holds stock in 
the S corporation. Additionally, for purposes of the election, the 
members of the family will include: (1) each potential current 
beneficiary	of	an	electing	small	business	trust	(ESBT)	who	is	a	
member	of	the	family,	(2)	the	income	beneficiary	of	a	qualified	
subchapter S trust (QSST) who makes the QSST election, if 
that	 income	beneficiary	 is	a	member	of	 the	 family,	 (3)	each	
beneficiary	of	a	trust	who	is	a	member	of	the	family,	if	the	trust	
was created primarily to exercise the voting power of stock 
transferred	to	it,	(4)	the	member	of	the	family	for	whose	benefit	
a trust described in I.R.C. §	1361(c)(2)(A)(vi) was created, (5) 
the deemed owner of a trust treated as wholly owned under 
subpart E of Part I of subchapter J of Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of 
the Internal Revenue Code, if that deemed owner is a member 
of the family, and (6) the owner of an entity disregarded as an 
entity separate from its owner under Treas. Reg. §	301.7701-3
of the Procedure and Administration Regulations, if that owner 
is a member of the family. If a corporation has two or more 
elections in effect and the members of one family for which 
the election has been made (the inclusive family) include all 
the members of another family for which the election was also 
made (the subsumed family), then the members of the inclusive 
family will be counted as one shareholder for purposes of I.R.C. 
§	1361(b)(1)(A) as long as the inclusive family’s election is in 
effect, and the members of the subsumed family will not be 
counted as a separate and additional shareholder. The election 
will	be	effective	as	of	the	first	day	of	the	corporation’s	taxable	
year designated by the shareholder making the election. Any 
election will remain in effect until terminated as provided in 
regulations. Taxpayers may have already taken certain actions 
in	order	to	make	this	election	by	various	forms	of	notification	
to the corporation or to the IRS. In order for the election to be 
effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2004, 
taxpayers will need to provide the information described in this 
guidance to the corporation (to the extent not already provided 
to the corporation). The corporation is required to keep records 
in accordance with I.R.C. §	6001 and the regulations thereunder. 
Notice 2005-91, I.R.B. 2005-51. 
INSuRANCE 
CROP INSuRANCE. The defendant rice farmer had 
purchased from the plaintiff insurance agency crop insurance 
in 1999 which covered crop damage from natural causes and 
contained a crop revenue coverage (CRC) provision that 
provided payment for prices received for the rice crop below a 
guaranteed price. In 2000, the defendant spoke with a different 
employee of the insurance agency and requested a quote on the 
same insurance for the 2000 rice crop. A written quote was 
provided to the defendant who signed it and returned it to the 
agency. The usual procedure was that the insurance premium 
was paid out of any claim made after harvest. During the 2000 
harvest the defendant indicated that a below-guaranteed price 
claim may be made and was informed that no CRC provision 
was included. When the defendant refused to pay the insurance 
premium, the plaintiff sued. The trial court ruled that a mutual 
mistake had occurred and reformed the original insurance 
contract to include a CRC provision. The trial court awarded 
damages to the defendant under the CRC provision, less 
the insurance premium. The appellate court noted that the 
determination of mutual mistake was a fact issue and that 
the trial court’s determination was entitled to deference. The 
appellate court held that the trial court’s ruling was supported 
by substantial evidence of mistake by both the defendant and 
the plaintiff’s agents and employees. The noted noted that the 
evidence included testimony of the plaintiff’s agents reference 
to a CRC policy obtained by the defendant before the claim 
was made and that the policy number on the 1999 CRC policy 
was the same as the policy for 2000, giving an indication 
to the defendant that the same policy was being continued 
for the 2000 crop year. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co, v. 
Bulliard Farm, Inc., 2005 La. App. LEXIS 2302 (La. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
NEGLIGENCE 
RECREATIONAL uSE. The Illinois Legislature has 
amended the Illinois Recreational Use statute, 745 ILCS 65, 
to allow protection from liability lawsuits for landowners, 
even though the landowners do not allow access to their land 
to all members of the public. The Act also removed residential 
buildings from the protection of the statute. In addition, the 
amendments include a restriction on covered activities to 
apply only to injuries resulting from “hunting or recreational 
shooting.” See Uchtman and Endres, “New Recreational 
Use Act Rules for Illinois Landowner Liability: Two Steps 
Forward, One Step Back,” 05-02 Agricultural Law and 
Taxation Briefs, Nov. 16, 2005. 
PRODuCTS LIABILITy 
CORN PICkER. The plaintiff was injured while attempting 
to unclog a corn picker manufactured by the defendant. The 
plaintiff was employed as a factory worker and had agreed to 
finish	the	corn	harvest	when	the	plaintiff’s	father	had	become	
ill. The court picker was pulled behind a tractor and used the 
PTO from the tractor for power. The plaintiff attempted to 
clear the picker while leaving the PTO on and engaged. The 
plaintiff sued for damages on the theory of defective design. 
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant 
on the grounds that the plaintiff voluntarily accepted a known 
risk	in	attempting	to	clear	the	picker	without	first	turning	off	
the PTO. The appellate court reversed, holding that summary 
judgment was improper because the evidence was inconclusive 
that	 this	 plaintiff	 had	 sufficient	 knowledge	 of	 the	 risks	 of	
attempting to unclog a running corn picker. The court even 
acknowledged that experienced farmers often do not appreciate 
the risk in such activities. Zigler v. AVCO Corp., 2005 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 5517 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
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STATE REGuLATION OF 
AGRICuLTuRE 
AVIAN FLu. The plaintiff was a chicken producer who 
contracted with individual farmers to raise chickens for the 
plaintiff. The Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture (PDA) had 
found	indications	of	avian	flu	in	several	flocks	of	the	plaintiff’s	
contract	farmers	and	quarantined	the	flocks,	although	the	PDA	did	
not	order	the	flocks	killed.		Instead,	an	association	of	producers	
purchased	the	suspect	flocks	and	destroyed	them	after	a	vote	of	
members.	The	flocks	were	later	determined	to	be	free	of	the	avian	 
flu.	The	producers	received		67	percent	of	the	value	of	the	destroyed	
flocks.		The	plaintiff	argued	that	the	association	acted	under	color	
of	law	for	the	PDA	and	the	quarantine	and	destruction	of	the	flocks	
violated the producers’ due process rights because no notice and 
hearing was provided. The court held that the association did not 
act under color of law but at the voluntary consent of its members. 
The court also held that due process rights were not violated 
because	the	quarantine	and	destruction	of	the	flocks	resulted	in	
adequate compensation. Reichley v. Pennsylvania Department 
of Agriculture, 427 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2005). 
VETERINARIANS 
STANDARD OF CARE. The plaintiff owned two cockatiels 
and several parakeets. The plaintiff took the cockatiels to the 
defendant for examination and the defendant prescribed a drug, 
Panacur, for the treatment of roundworm in the birds as well as 
the other birds owned by the plaintiff. The birds became worse 
and the plaintiff took them to another veterinarian who claimed 
that Panacur was toxic to cockatiels and parakeets. The plaintiff 
sued for the loss of the birds under theories of negligence and 
breach of implied warranty. The court held that the standard of 
negligence for a veterinarian was that of a veterinarian of ordinary 
skill, care and diligence, demonstrated by expert testimony as to 
the proper treatment involved in the case. The defendant presented 
evidence of the research on the use of Panacur on parasites in 
animals and humans and the lack of any federal law or regulation 
prohibiting the use of Panacur on humans or animals. The court 
held that the defendant’s evidence constituted expert testimony 
which place the burden on the plaintiff to supply opposing expert 
testimony. The plaintiff did not provide any expert testimony or 
written opinions but provided only general information on the 
treatment of cockatiels and parakeets. The court held that the 
plaintiff’s	evidence	was	insufficient	to	raise	an	issue	of	fact	as	to	
the standard of care exercised by the defendant in the treatment 
of the plaintiff’s birds; therefore, the court held that the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant was proper. 
ullmann v. Duffus, 2005 Ohio App. 5463 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2005). 
PRINCIPLES OF AGRICuLTuRAL LAW 
The Agricultural Law Press issued a new edition of Principles of Agricultural Law in 
August 2005 in a new format. To celebrate the new format, the Agricultural Law Press is 
offering the Principles at $100.00 postpaid, a $15.00 savings over the regular price. Order 
your copy now and receive the next update (January 2006) free. Order now because this 
offer expires December 31, 2005. Contact Robert Achenbach at 541-302-1958 or e-mail: 
Robert@agrilawpress.com 
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